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This thesis studies the market equilibrium of innovation 
adoption and timing of R&D, it also investigates the payment 
contract in R&D. When a successful innovation has been realized, 
the market equilibrium adoption is shown to be dependent on the 
owner of the innovation in Chapter 4, and it is not always 
efficient. It is because the mechanism for licensing does not 
necessarily results in an efficient innovation adoption. 
Condition of efficient equilibrium is stated in Proposition 4.3. 
Suppose that the innovator can appropriate the entire gain from 
adoption, the equilibrium innovation adoption is then independent 
of the ownership. In addition, firms will offer identical 
employment contracts to the researcher if there is only one 
researcher in the market, even though firms are not identical. 
It can be found in Proposition 3.3. 
In the second part of the thesis, sequential R&D and 
simultaneous R&D are examined when firms are identical. If the 
expected profits of each firm are equalized in equilibrium, it 
can be shown that sequential R&D may be the equilibrium. It is 
because the competitive simultaneous R&D may be dominated by a 
sequential R&D, although central planning simultaneous R&D is 
efficient. Therefore, it tells us that strategy behaviour causes 
sequential R&D. 
I hereby acknowledge Prof. Liu P. W. , Dr. Kwong K. S. and Mr. Pun 
W. C. for their helpful suggestions in my thesis. Prof. Liu and 
Dr. Kwong give me invaluable advice, and Mr. Pun also devotes his 
time to my thesis. 
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Research and development (RSlD) activities have been studied 
by economists for a long time, which are analyzed in the 
following aspects, i) diffusion of new technology, ii) the 
relationship between R&D and persistence of monopoly and iii) 
patenting and R&D competition. Arrow[2] points out that firms 
do not only compete in the product market by using pricing 
strategy, but also engage in R&D competition. Since the product 
of R&D activities is production cost reduction, a firm adopting 
an innovation will acquire a greater market share. Thus, firms 
will invest in R&D so as to maximize their net profits. Arrow[2] 
also emphasises the features of the product of R&D. The product 
of R&D is a piece of information, i.e., a production technology, 
and is indivisible and difficult to appropriate. In addition, 
it is difficult for the buyer to evaluate the profitability of 
the innovation. Therefore, many studies are related to the above 
three properties of R&D. 
In contrast, this thesis studies the equilibrium adoption 
and timing of R&D. When there is a successful innovation, the 
market equilibrium of innovation adoption is shown as dependent 
on the owner of the innovation in chapter 4. Therefore, the 
equilibrium adoption of innovation may not be pareto optimal. 
In chapter 3, the innovator is assumed to appropriate the entire 
gain from adoption, so market equilibrium of innovation adoption 
is shown to be efficient. Sequential R&D and simultaneous R&D 
are compared in chapter 5, where the necessary condition for 
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simultaneous R&D is derived. Moreover, it shows that strategy 
behaviour also results in sequential equilibrium. 
In this thesis, it also studies the relationship between R&D 
contract and competition in the product market. What is the 
contract of R&D? The contract is an agreement between a firm and 
a researcher, while the researcher is a person who conducts R&D. 
Therefore, the co-operative relationship between them affects the 
amount of payment and nature of payment. What is the meaning of 
the nature of payment? If the researcher is an employee of a 
firm and the effort of the employee is verifiable, the payment 
is a wage which is independent of the outcome of R&D. In 
contrast, the amount of payment is dependent on the outcome of 
R&D if the researcher is an independent party. An independent 
researcher is one who conducts R&D, and he maximizes income by 
licensing or selling the innovation. However, the determination 
of the two types of relationship will not be investigated here. 
Then, what is the outcome of the innovation? Since R&D 
activities aim to find a production cost reducing technology, the 
outcome of R&D is production cost reduction and it is mentioned 
in Arrow[2] . As the researcher is an input of R&D, it implies 
that there is a researching process for the discovery of 
innovation. The process is a research methodology and is 
recognized by all parties. However, the outcome of R&D is not 
always production cost reduction, it may be an unsuccessful 
innovation, i.e., the cost of production will not decrease after 
adopting the unsuccessful innovation. Therefore, a firm never 
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adopts the unsuccessful innovation, and the researching process 
is simplified as a probability distribution of outcome in this 
thesis. 
A successful innovation gives the firm a reduction in 
production cost, but the firm also benefits from selling licenses 
to other firms, which are competitors of the innovator. There 
is an assumption on the innovation, i.e., the innovation is 
protected perfectly by patent laws. Suppose that the successful 
innovator patents the innovation, other firms cannot duplicate 
or imitate the innovation. In other words, its competitors 
cannot benefit from the realization of a successful innovation. 
Nevertheless, it is possible for its competitor to conduct R&D 
after an innovation has realized. It is because patent laws 
allow innovations discovered from the same researching process 
providing that an innovation is not a copy of another innovation. 
Therefore, an innovation resulted from a recognized researching 
process is always allowable. 
As the innovation is patented and the cost of information 
transmission is zero, the joint profit of the innovator and its 
competitors may increase due to the adoption of the innovation. 
However, it does not mean that the joint profit always increases 
from sharing of innovation. If the joint profit cannot rise from 
sharing the innovation, the innovator will not sell licenses to 
its competitor and it adopts the innovation alone. The sharing 
of innovation is considered before licensing, i.e., which firm 
adopts the innovation. In chapters 3 and 5, the innovator 
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identifies the optimal sharing of innovation and gets all the 
benefit from adoption. Since there are only two firms in the 
market, the innovator either shares the innovation or adopts the 
innovation alone. In other words, the adoption of innovation 
must be efficient when the innovator maximizes its profit. 
However, the circumstance is changed in chapter 4, while the 
innovator cannot appropriate all the benefit from adoption, so 
the adoption is not necessarily efficient. 
When the researcher is an independent party, he may sell the 
ownership of his innovation to a firm. Although the researcher 
can sell licenses to firms and enjoys benefit from licensing, he 
will choose to sell the innovation if price of the innovation is 
greater than those license fees. Why does the price of 
innovation be greater than license fees? Consider the decision 
of a firm, the firm will not offer a price of innovation which 
is greater than the gain from the innovation, while license fees 
and production cost reduction are the gain from innovation. 
Therefore, the gain for each party will be studied and compared 
so that it can show whether the independent researcher sells the 
innovation or not. If the researcher desires to sell the 
innovation in equilibrium, the purchasing contract will then 
specify the payment from a firm to the researcher. In chapter 
4, it shows that prices offered by firms are equalized in 
equilibrium, while the price is not strictly greater than license 
fees that the researcher can get for all cases. Therefore, the 
researcher does not necessarily sell the ownership to a firm and 
the price is dependent on the outcome of R&D, i.e.. the payment 
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is increasing in the production cost reduction. 
The relationship between supply of researcher and employment 
contract is studied in chapters 3 and 5. In chapter 3, firms are 
not identical and there is only one researcher in the factor 
market. Since the researcher is a necessary input in R&D, the 
competition of R&D becomes a competition of researcher. 
Moreover, the sharing of innovation is efficient as the innovator 
can get all the co-operative benefit from licensing. It implies 
the joint profit is maximized in equilibrium. Since the gain 
from R&D is the co-operative benefit, so the gains of each firm 
are equal to each other in equilibrium and they offer identical 
employment contracts to the researcher eventually. 
In contrast, the supply of researcher is infinite elastic, 
so the firms can conduct R&D simultaneously or sequentially. 
Therefore, a firm employs researchers to conduct R&D, while the 
probability of success is increasing in the R&D expenditure. A 
firm decides when R&D will be conducted and how many researcher 
will be engaged. It is assumed that expected net profits of 
firms are equalized in equilibrium for they are identical firms. 
When a firm benefits from conducting R&D earlier than its 
competitors, firms will conduct R&D simultaneously as soon as 
possible. In chapter 5, the necessary condition for the 
existence of sequential R&D is studied. So long as sequential 
R&D dominates the simultaneous R&D, i.e., the expected net 
profits of firm in sequential R&D are not less than the expected 
net profits of firm in simultaneous R&D, even a firm is the 
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leader, its expected net profit is not greater than its 
competitors, Otherwise, its competitor will also conduct R&D in 
the same period. A characterization of sequential R&D is 
depicted in chapter 5. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous studies in R&D are mainly in three fields, i) 
profitability of an innovation and technology adoption, ii) 
market structure and licensing, and iii) incentives of preemptive 
innovation. In this thesis, payment contracts of R&D will be 
investigated, while the payment is obviously dependent on the 
benefits of R&D. The benefits of R&D are the production cost 
reduction, license fees from sharing of innovation and gain from 
early innovation. Therefore, the previous studies are summarized 
as following and some assumptions of them are adopted in the 
modelling of this thesis. 
Given a cost of adoption, a firm will adopt the innovation 
if the expected gain from adoption is not less than the cost of 
adoption. Reinganum[29] depicted the case that firms are 
uncertain about the value of an innovation, and have only a 
probability distribution of profitability. Suppose that the 
profit of a firm is increasing in its competitors unit cost of 
production and is decreasing in the firm's unit cost of 
production. When firms have different unit cost of production, 
a high cost firm likely adopts the innovation and a low cost firm 
is less likely to adopt the innovation, because the expected 
benefit for the high cost firm is greater than the low cost firm. 
Thus, the differential in unit cost of production will become 
smaller. 
Jensen[17] describes a model with identical firms which are 
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uncertain about the profitability of an innovation. However, 
firms differ in prior belief of the profitability and they will 
adjust their beliefs because signal about the profitability will 
be announced every period, where adjustment of their beliefs is 
based on Bayesian inference. Since adoption is costly, the net 
profit of innovation adoption depends on the profitability of the 
innovation. Therefore, identical firms will differ in adoption 
due to their difference in their beliefs. So studies of 
Reinganuin[29] and Jensen[17] explain the innovation adoption by 
differential in production cost and beliefs. They imply that 
identical firms with common belief adopt an innovation 
simultaneously, and they ignore the determination of adoption 
cost. Therefore, Reinganum[31, 32] and Quirnibach[28] try to 
explain the phenomenon by adoption strategy and market structure 
respectively. 
A non-zero sum game with two persons is used by 
Reinganum[31, 32]. Firms precommit in adoption date, where the 
adoption cost declines in time. Even though firms are certain 
about the profitability of innovation and they are identical, 
they will adopt the innovation sequentially due to strategic 
behaviour. Since the benefit from adoption is decreasing in the 
number of firms adopting the innovation and its decreasing rate 
is slower than the decreasing rate of adoption cost, firms will 
not choose to adopt simultaneously. The relationship between 
market structure and diffusion of new technology is investigated 
in Quirmbach[28]. The profit of firm increases due to adoption, 
and decreases if another firm adopts the innovation. It points 
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out that decreasing adoption cost and incremental adoption joint 
benefit in number of firms are necessary and sufficient condition 
for diffusion. As adoption of an innovation is certain and 
viable, firm will adopt the innovation as soon as possible if 
adoption cost is increasing. On the other hand, declining 
adoption benefit implies the first adoption firm can get more 
than other firms. In other words, no firm is willing to adopt 
the innovation later than other firms. The significance of 
Reinganum[31, 32] and Quirmbach[28] are that they find out the 
necessary condition for diffusion and they point out the 
relationship between market structure and diffusion. Therefore, 
adoption of an innovation depends on adoption of another firm in 
this thesis and it is a market equilibrium. 
Benoit[3] studies the relationship between imitation and 
cost of R&D. When imitation is allowed, firms will respond not 
immediately due to the uncertainty of the innovation's 
profitability. Since the competitor of the innovator can wait 
to observe more information about the profitability, the high 
fixed adoption cost of innovation may deter competitors to 
imitate immediately. Therefore, high fixed adoption cost R&D 
will be tried and the innovation is protected. It implies that 
the lack of patent will result in a selection of R&D, which is 
based on the profitability of the innovation and the probability 
of imitation. Innovation in this thesis is assumed to be 
protected by patent laws so that fixed cost of adoption can be 
ignored. 
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The implication of an innovation protected by patent laws 
is that the innovator can sell the right of adoption. In other 
words, the price of selling the right is incorporated, into 
benefits of innovation. However, how are the amount and the form 
of the price determined? The form of appropriation is studied 
in Kamien[18]. Fixed fee and per unit royalty are compared, and 
fixed fee is shown to dominate royalty. When per unit royalty 
is imposed on all firms and it restricts output of firms, fixed 
fee is shown to dominate per unit royalty. The amount of license 
fee is investigated in Katz[22], where the innovator will sell 
licenses to all identical firms or sell licenses to some of them 
by auction. Therefore, licensing is assumed, in this thesis and 
per unit royalty is ignored for it is not necessary to analyze. 
The timing of R&D is another question for a firm, i.e., when 
to conduct R&D. Why does a firm conduct R&D earlier than other 
firms? One reason is given in Gilbert[11], which points out that 
a monopolistic firm has incentive to maintain its monopoly power 
by investing in R&D, and it patents the innovation before 
potential competitors enter the market. The innovation may not 
be adopted by the monopolistic firm, which is used to threaten 
potential competitors. When a potential competitor enters the 
market, the monopolistic firm will adopt the innovation and make 
the potential competitor gains zero profit. Thus, such kind of 
patents may never be adopted and licensed to other firms, as they 
are tools for maintaining monopoly power. 
From the above discussion, the adoption cost for a firm is 
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license fee, while the adoption benefit of an innovator is the 
license fee above declined profit if its competitors adopt the 
innovation. These features are inherent in this thesis, however, 
the timing of R&D has not been resolved. Although Gilbert[11] 
states that a monopolistic firm will conduct R&D earlier than 
other firms but it raises two questions. Firstly, when firms are 
identical, which one will conduct R&D? Secondly, it ignores the 
possibility that potential entrants can also conduct R&D. A 
similar circumstance is studied in Fudenberg[9], which shows rent 
equalization even if preemption is allowed. Since firms choose 
the timing of adoption freely, the net profit of adoption must 
be equalized in equilibrium. Suppose that a firm can get more 
in adoption earlier than another firms, its competitor will try 
to adopt earlier than the firm. Therefore, sequential adoption 
is an equilibrium provided that their net profit are equalized 
in equilibrium. Moreover, the necessary condition for sequential 
adoption is a decreasing cost of adoption. This thesis follows 
the point of rent equalization in Fudenberg[9 3 , it means that the 
expected net profits of each firm are equalized in equilibrium. 
However, the cost of R&D is license fee, and it will not be 
decreasing in time, so sequential R&D is not based on decreasing 
cost. 
12 
3 R&D ACTIVITIES AND COMPETING FOR A RESEARCHER 
The profit of a firm is influenced by the market structure 
of the product market and production technology. The market 
structure representing competition among various firms, is 
related to production cost of all firms. For example, when all 
firms are operating with constant marginal cost of production and 
the market demand is very elastic, the firm with the lowest 
marginal cost of production will become a monopoly. Therefore, 
production cost can affect the market structure and the profit 
of a firm. In addition, production cost is determined by factor 
cost and production technology. The influence of factor cost of 
production on a firm's profit has been studied for a long time 
and competition among firms will affect factor cost when the 
supply of factor is not infinitely elastic. However, the 
relationship between the factor cost of production and the profit 
of a firm is not an interest in this thesis. In this thesis, 
production technology will no longer be treated as an exogenous 
factor. It means that a firm can invest in its production 
technology so that production cost can be reduced by an improved 
production method, and such activities are called research and 
development (R&D). In other words, a firm's profit is affected 
by R&D activities. 
When an innovation is patented and protected by patent laws, 
other firms are not allowed to duplicate the innovation. If 
other firms can be better off by adopting a patented innovation' 
they must be willing to pay for the adoption of the innovation. 
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The innovator will consider the impact of selling a license to 
a firm and decide whether to sell the license to that firm or 
not. Thus, a firm will benefit from production cost reduction 
as well as the license fee by investing in R&D, and these 
benefits are incentives for conducting R&D. In this chapter, the 
innovator is assumed to appropriate the entire additional gain 
of a licensee due to the adoption of an innovation. When a firm 
does not adopt an innovation, which is patented by its 
competitor, the profit of the firm is defined as its reservation 
profit. Then, the license fee will be equal to the difference 
between the licensee's reservation profit and the profit after 
adoption. In other words, the licensee will be indifferent 
between adoption or not. 
What is the outcome of R&D? In many studies, such as 
Dasgupta[5] and Reinganuiti[33], the outcome of R&D is stated as 
a date of invention. These studies assume that the higher the 
amount has been invested in R&D, the earlier the date of 
invention will be realized. On the other hand, the outcome of 
R&D is specified to be a reduction of marginal cost of production 
in KatzC20] . I assume here that the outcome of R&D is a 
production technology, i.e., an information, so it refers to a 
method for marginal cost reduction. The uncertainty of R&D is 
the amount of marginal cost reduction. An outcome of R&D is 
regarded as successful if the reduction of marginal cost is 
positive. If a production technology results in a negative 
marginal cost reduction, it will never be adopted in production. 
Therefore, a firm will merely adopt an innovation which gives a 
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positive marginal cost reduction. 
In this chapter, R&D activities must be conducted by at 
least one firm and an expert researcher. It is simplified 
naturally that only one researcher can be found, in the factor 
market, or the researcher is the unique one who possesses the 
skill of conducting R&D. Thus, R&D competition will become a 
competition for the researcher. When a firm wins the 
competition, it is called a winning firm and other firms are 
called losing firms. The winning firm offers an employment 
contract to the researcher, the contract will specify a wage for 
the researcher. After the outcome of R&D has been realized, the 
winning firm will patent a successful innovation and consider 
whether to sell the license to its competitors or to adopt the 
innovation alone. I have mentioned that the profit of firms are 
interdependent, because the profit of a firm will decrease if its 
competitors adopt a successful innovation. When the increment 
of a competitor's profit is greater than the decline in 
innovator's profit as selling the license, the innovator will 
sell a license to that competitor. 
In this thesis, there are two oligopolistic firms i and j 
in the product market, they are not identical but adopt 
equivalent current technology. In other words, their marginal 
cost of production are equal to each other, which are called 
marginal costs in the following discussion. Firm i and firm j 
are interdependent because the profit function of firm i is 
decreasing in its marginal cost and increasing in the marginal 
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cost of firm y. Given a method in conducting R&D, the outcome 
of R&D gives a constant marginal cost reduction Q/ where 6 G 
{0,6) and 0 is strictly greater than zero. 
Assumption 3.1 : is twice different!able w.r.t and 
ej and it is strictly increasing in 9' and 
decreasing in 
Assumption 3.2 : ti'(0,0) = and > jx' for 6 > 0. 
In Arrow[2] and Reinganum[32], a firm can adopt an 
innovation any time, the cost of adoption is decreasing in time. 
In other words, a firm chooses the time for adopting a successful 
innovation and the cost of adoption is exogenous. It is actually 
a circumstance for innovation adoption and also assumes the 
existence of a successful innovation. Their models are 
incomplete, since a successful innovation does not necessarily 
exist at any time. In this thesis, it does not assume that a 
firm may adopt an innovation at any time, because the outcome of 
R&D is not always successful. If the outcome of R&D is not 
successful, it is impossible for a firm to adopt an innovation. 
Hence, the assumptions in Arrow[2] and Reinganum[32] are relaxed 
in this thesis, and the cost of adoption is no longer exogenous. 
1 This formulation follows Katz[20]. 
2 An innovation is said to be successful if e > 0. 
3 On the other hand, n^OSe^) is strictly decreasing in 
and increasing in 9�. 
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3.1 LICENSING DECISION OF A SUCCESSFUL INNOVATOR 
After e has been realized, the innovator has three choices 
of adoption arrangement, i) firm i adopts the innovation only, 
ii) firm i and firm j adopt the innovation simultaneously and 
iii) firm j adopt the innovation alone. The three types of 
adoption are called (SI), (S2) and (S3) in this thesis. The 
reservation profit of a losing firm is equal to its profit when 
the winning firm adopts the innovation alone, so the reservation 
profits of firm i and firm j are Tt'(0,e) and 1x^ (6,0) 
respectively. It is because the innovator is assumed to 
appropriate the licensee's entire additional gain from adoption, 
so the license fee is equal to the difference of the licensee's 
profit after adoption and the licensee's reservation profit. 
After selling the license, the profit of innovator will fall. 
Thus, the license fee must be greater than the decline of the 
innovator‘s profit, which is the necessary condition for 
licensing. Otherwise, the innovator will not share the 
innovation with its competitor. Let the total profit of an 
innovator be the sum of the innovator's profit and the license 
fee. The total profit of an innovator will not be less than the 
innovator's adoption alone profit, where the adoption alone 
profit of firm i and firm j are it^O^O) and respectively. 
Thus, the innovator chooses among (SI), (S2) and (S3) to ensure 
total profit of the innovator is the largest. In the following 
section, benefits of firm i and firm j from licensing will be 
examined. 
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Benefits of Firm i with Licensing 
i) In the first type of adoption arrangement (SI), firm i will 
not sell the license to firm j, even though the innovation 
is successful. Therefore, firm i benefits from adopting 
the innovation alone. The total profit of firm i is equal 
to V ( e ) = Ti'Ce^O). 
ii) Firm i shares the innovation with firm j in the second type 
of adoption arrangement (S2). The additional gain of firm 
j from the innovation is equal to Tt^ (9,9) - Ti^ (e,0), where 
the last term is the reservation profit of firm j and it 
has been mentioned in previous section. Then, firm i will 
receive (6, 6) - nU6/ 0) as the license fee and the total 
profit of firm i from the innovation is = Tii(e'e) + 
Tij(e,e) - Ti^ (e,0). The necessary condition of choosing (S2) 
is Ti'(e,0) 一 TI 丄（9,e) < Iij(e,e) 一 n^Ce^O), which means that 
the license fee must be greater than the decline of firm 
i‘s profit. 
iii) In the last case, firm i does not adopt the innovation in 
(S3), but it allows firm j to adopt the innovation alone. 
Excluding the license fee, the profit of firm i decreases 
because the profit of firm i becomes n丄（0,6). Similar to 
the case of (S2), the total profit of firm i is required to 
fulfil the condition that the license fee is greater than 
_ TtUO,e), i.e., the decline of firm i's profit in 
adoption arrangement (S3), and the total profit of firm i 
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will be v"(e) = Tij(o,e) - Ti^ (e,0) + Ti'(0,e). 
The above results are summarised as follows. 
Firm i (Innovator) Firm j 
(51) vu(e) = Ti乂e,o) ； Tij(e,o) 
(52) V ( e ) = Ti�e,e) + [n^e'e) - iiHe'o)] ； Ti^ (e,0) 
(53) vi3(e) = [Tcj(o,e) 一 Tij(e,o)] + Ti'(o,e) ； n^ce^o) 
Terms in square brackets ar6 the license fee in (SI)' (S2) 
and (S3), while 0,0) is the reservation profit of firm j . 
Benefits of Firm j with Licensing 
i) When firm j is the winning firm, firm j can appropriate the 
entire additional gain of firm i due to adoption. In (SI), 
total profit of firm j is V^^(e) = Ti^ (e,0) 一 ixHO'e) + 
Tcj(e,0). As an equilibrium choice, the amount of license 
fee, i.e., _ Ti^ (0,e), cannot be less than the 
decline of firm j profit, which is equal to ir^O'e) — 
ii) Firm j can share the innovation with firm i, i.e., (S2), so 
total profit of firm j is V^^(e) = 11^6,6) + 几丄（e, e) - V (�'e) 
where 11^6,9) - 1x^0,9) is the license fee. 
iii) At last, firm j adopts the innovation alone (S3) and 
refuses to sell the license to firm i. The total profit of 
no. 
firm j will be V^'(e) = Ti^ (0,e). 
Benefits of Firm j with licensing are stated as follows. 
Firm j (Innovator) Firm i 
(51) vji(e) = [Ti'(0,O) 一 Ti'(0,e)] + n'ce^O) ； n^o^e) 
(52) vj2(e) = Tcj(e,e) + [Ti'(e,e) - Ti'(0,e)] ； Ti'(o,e) 
(53) vj3(e) = 1x^ (0,0) ； Ti'(0,e) 
Terms in square brackets are the license fee in (SI), (S2) 
and (S3), while Ti'(0,e) is the reservation profit of firm i. 
It has been shown that the reservation profits of firm i and 
firm j are Ti'(0,e) and irUe'O) respectively. When 0 has been 
realized, the profit of the losing firm will be independent of 
the winning firm's adoption arrangement. For example, when firm 
i is the losing firm, the profit of firm i is equal to Tt'(0,e) in 
all adoption arrangements (SI) to (S3). 
Define V^O) = max { V^^(e), V丄 (^e) } > 1x^0,0) 
v^e) = max { vji(e), Vj2(e)' v^^(e) } > nHo.e) 
Assumption 3.3 : i) JI^  - > - Tij(e,0) and 
ii) Tii(e,0) - Tt^  > n乂0,e) -
As firm i and firm j are not identical. Assumption 3.3 
states the difference between them. The (ii) of assumption 3.3 
19 b 
means that firm i is more efficient in adopting the innovation. 
The LHS of Assumption 3.3 (i) is the decline of firm i's profit 
when firm j adopts a successful innovation, whereas the RHS of 
Assumption 3.3 (i) is the decline of firm j 's profit when firm 
i adopts a successful innovation. By Assumption 3.3, it can be 
shown that (S3) is dominated by (SI), hence the equilibrium 
adoption arrangement must not be (S3)* 
Proposition 3.1 : (S3) is strictly dominated by (SI) 
regardless of which is the winning firm. 
Proof Combining the (i) and (ii) of Assumption 3.3, i.e.' 
Ti'(e,0) - Tt' > K^  (0, e) 一 and 
(0,e) - < Tr»(e,o) - ix^  
it becomes 
The last expression shows that 
Ti^(0,O) - Ti^(0,e) - 11^0,6) + Ti�e,0) > O or 
一 vi3(e) > 0 and vji(e) - v^'O) > o / 
QED 
Proposition 3.1 shows that firm j will not adopt (S3) as an 
equilibrium adoption arrangement, even though firm j is the 
winning firm. It is because the increment of firm i's profit 
from adopting an innovation alone is greater than the increment 
4 v“fe) - v" (e ) = vji(e) -
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of firm j ‘ s profit. It has been mentioned previously that the 
winning firm can appropriate the licensee's entire additional 
gain from the adoption of an innovation. Thus, firm j will 
choose (SI) instead of (S3) because the profit of firm i is more 
sensitive to marginal cost reduction^ than the profit of firm j . 
It implies that firm j will not adopt the innovation alone but 
will threaten to adopt it in licensing. The threat of firm j 
will be effective in licensing, because firm j will adopt the 
innovation alone providing that firm i refuses to adopt the 
innovation. As Proposition 3.1 shows that (S3) cannot be 
observed in equilibrium, or the firm with a less sensitive profit 
function w.r.t. e will never adopt an innovation alone, then, 
V^(e) and Vj(e) can be re-written as following expressions, 
V^O) = max { vii(e), Vi2(e), Vi3(e) } 
=max { Vii(e), J and 
V^e) = max { vji(e), Vj2(e), v^'(e) } 
二 max { vji(e), Vj2(e) }• 
A winning firm chooses an equilibrium adoption arrangement 
among (SI) and (S2). Will equilibrium adoption arrangement of 
firm i be the same as equilibrium arrangement of firm j for a 
given innovation? When the equilibrium adoption arrangement is 
chosen regardless of the winning firm, the sum of firm i 丨s profit 
and firm j's profit will depend merely on the outcome of R&D. 
Such a sum is called joint profit in the following discussion. 
Otherwise, it will also be dependent on the winning firm. 
5 It is the Assumption 3.3. 
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Although the decision of adoption arrangement is a result of 
maximizing the total profit of winning firm through licensing, 
it is equivalent to maximize the joint profit. It is because the 
reservation profit of firm i and firm j are (0,9) and k^ (6,0) 
respectively, and they are independent of various adoption 
arrangements. Let firm i be the successful innovator, it will 
choose (SI) when > V''(e), and hence V'^(Q) + > 
V''(e) + Ti^  (e, 0). The last expression means the joint profit in 
(SI) is strictly greater than the joint profit in (S2). 
Similarly, if firm j is the successful innovator, it chooses (SI) 
only when the joint profit in (SI) is strictly greater than the 
joint profit in (S2). Moreover, the joint profit of a particular 
e is independent of the winning firm. It implies that the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement will also be independent of the 
winning firm too. 
Definition 3.1 : W(e) is defined as the largest joint profit 
for a given e, i.e. , max { tx' (6,0) + 
Proposition 3.2 : (Equivalence of Licensing Decision) When a 
successful innovation has been realized, the 
adoption arrangement will be chosen 
regardless of the winning firm. 
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Proof It can be shown that 
vu(e) > Vi2(e) - vji(e) > v^^(e) 
样 vji(e) + Ti;i(o,e) > + TI'(0,G) 
joint profit in SI > joint profit in S2 
Moreover, 
v " (e ) < vi2(e) ^ v^'(e) < 
-vji(e) + Ti'(0,e) < vj2(e) + Ti'(0,e) 
^ joint profit in SI < joint profit in S2 
It shows that the equilibrium adoption arrangement can 
be obtained though finding the largest joint profit, 
i.e., W(e) = max { Ti (^e,0) + 11^0,9) + Tij(0,e) 
where W(e) has been defined as the largest joint 
profit. In other words, the necessary and sufficient 
condition of the equilibrium adoption arrangement is 
to maximize the joint profit. 
QED 
Proposition 3.1 and 3.2^ have shown that the equilibrium 
adoption arrangement will never be (S3) and will be identical 
regardless of the winning firm. In addition, the largest joint 
profit of a given 6 will be independent of the winning firm. 
6 coase Theorem also states that the market equilibria 
independent of the ownership when completely 
appropriation is assumed. 
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3.2 COMPETING FOR THE RESEARCHER 
What is the incentive for R&D competition? For example, let 
firm i be the winning firm. The total profit of firm i is V'(©) 
> ii'(e,0) > Ti'(0,e) and the net profit of firm i is V'(0) 一 w, 
where w is the wage. If firm i does not compete for the 
researcher, firm i will receive its reservation profit, i.e., 
Ti^  (0, 9), when a successful innovation has been realized. Thus, 
firm i has to compete for the researcher, if the expected net 
profit of being a winning firm is greater than the expected 
reservation profit. Similarly, firm J will compete for the 
researcher, too. 
In this chapter, competitive R&D is assumed. The 
requirement for conducting R&D is to employ the researcher. How 
can a firm win the competition for the researcher? Firstly, an 
employment contract, which is offered by the winning firm, will 
specified a wage which is not less than the wage offered by its 
competitor. In the meantime, the expected reservation profit of 
the losing firm must not be less than the expected net profit of 
the losing firm in equilibrium, otherwise, both firms continue 
to compete for the researcher. Let and ,-t 丨 represent a 
winning firm and a losing firm in equilibrium respectively. 
Definitions 3.2a and 3.2b are given as follow. 
Definition 3.2a : R-^'O) denotes the reservation profit of 
firm when firm ,t' is the winning firm 
in equilibrium. 
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Definition 3.2b : R^  '^ Ce) denotes the reservation profit of 
firm ‘t‘ when firm ‘t‘ is the winning firm 
in equilibrium^. 
After e has been realized, firms i and j compete for the 
researcher. If firm i is the winning firm, the reservation 
profit of firm j is (8,0) . Although firm i is the winning 
firm, it will not offer a wage which makes the expected profit 
of the winning firm less than Ti'(0,e) . Therefore, = 
Ti^  (e, 0) and R'''(e) = (0, e) . In other words, the Definition 3.2a 
defines the reservation profit of a losing firm, whereas the 
Definition 3.2b defines the reservation profit of a winning firm. 
Following the Assumptions 3.2a and 3.2b, equations (3.1) and 
(3.2) are derived. 
R � （ e ) = R-t'-t(e) (3-1) 
Rt't(e) = Rt,-t(e) (3.2) 
For firm 't' is defined as the winning firm in equilibrium, 
the joint profit is then equal to W(e) after innovation adoption 
and licensing. Since the reservation profit of winning firm , _t, 
is R-t't(e), firm 'f has W(e) - which is the revenue of 
firm 't' after licensing. Moreover, firm i.e., the winning 
firm, has an opportunity cost for conducting R&D, which has been 
defined as R^ '-^ (e) and is equal to R^^O), the gain from the 
^ Similarly, there are R-^-^O) and Rt'-t(e) if firm '-t' 
fr^he wiping firm. Although firm ’-t，is defined as 
the losing firm and loses in equilibrium, it is 
possible for firm '-t' to be the winning firm. 
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innovation is W(e) - R-t't(e) - R^'^(e) • Let W(e) - -
Rt't(e) s H(G) is the maximiuin possible gain from an innovation 
e. 
w(e) - R-t't(e) - Rt't(e) ^  o (3.3) 
or w(e) - R-t'-t(e) - Rt'-t(e) > o (3.3') 
By Definition 3.1, W(e) > Ti'(e,0) + Ti^ (e,0) > + 
Rt't(e). Equation (3.3' ) results from combining (3,1), (3.2) and 
(3.3). Let Wt and w-t be wages offered by firms 't' and '-t' in 
equilibrium. Constraints of the winning firm are then stated in 
expressions as follows, 
似 t ^ ^-t 
d B 
f f O ) dd >： f[md) ds-w, (c) 
a fi 
where f (.) is the density function of 9. The first equation 
states that the wage offered by the winning firm will not be less 
than the wage offered by the losing firm. The second equation 
(C), i.e., the competing condition, shows that the expected 
reservation profit of the losing firm will not be less than the 
expected net profit of the losing firm, where W(e) - in 
(C) is the revenue of firm . Therefore, the RHS of (C) is 
the expected net profit of the losing firm. Will equation (C) 
hold in inequality in equilibrium? Consider the winning firm's 
reaction for a given w.., the winning firm will maximize its 
expected net profit so that its expected net profit will not be 
less than its expected reservation profit. The reaction of the 
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winning firm is described in the following, 




Jr-^'^O) f(d) dS ^ dd - (C) 
a Q. 
where (C) is required to fulfil because it is the market 
equilibrium condition, and it implies Wt ^ E[ H(e) . 
Characterization of the Equilibrium 
In this section, the equilibrium is defined as Nash. For 
a given w_t, the winning firm 't' will offer a higher wage than 
the wage of firm ‘ -t ‘ only when the wage of firm •-t' results in 
a profit that is less than H(e). 
Wt > w.t when w.t < E[ H(e)] 
Wt = w_t when w_t = E[ H(e)] 
Wt < w_t when w.t > E[ H(e)] 
Since firm is defined as the winning firm, condition (C) 
rules out the first case and the third case', vC = in 
equilibrium, 
8 E[ - ] is an expectation operator w.r.t. 6. 
9 If firm «t' is the winning firm, w^  has to be greater 
than w一t -
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Proposition 3.3 ： In equilibrium, the winning firm and the 
losing firm offer identical employment 
contracts to the researcher. 
Proposition 3.3 shows that the winning firm and the losing 
firm provide identical employment contracts to the researcher in 
equilibrium. Moreover, Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.2 tell 
the fact that the equilibrium adoption arrangement and the amount 
of R&D expenditure, i.e., wage, will be identical regardless of 
which firm is the winning firm. What is the reason for these 
results? It is because there is a unique researcher in the 
market. The losing firm offers its expected additional gain from 
innovation to compete for the researcher. In fact, the 
additional gain from innovation is equal to subtracting the 
reservation profit of firm i and firm j from the joint profit, 
and the three components of the additional gain are independent 
of the winning firm. Denote A as the incentive of conducting 
R&D, i .e, the additional gain from innovation, then, the 
incentive for firm i and firm j are stated below, 
Ai = [ W(e) - tiM e, 0) ] - Tt'(O,0) and 
A^  : [ w(e) - TiHo,e) ] - 11^9,0). 
where terms in brackets represent the profit of the winning firm. 
Since the additional gain of firm i and firm j equalize for all 
e, the expected additional gain will be equal to each other. It 
implies that firm i and firm j will offer their entire expected 
additional gain to compete for the researcher. Since (C) holds 
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in equality in equilibrium, (C) can be re-written as follows, 
E[ w(e) - Rt't(e) - R-t't(e) ] = = w/ 
where LHS of the above expression is the expected additional gain 
from conducting R&D. 
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3.3 CONCLUDING REMARK 
If there is only one researcher in the market and the 
winning firm can appropriate the losing firm's entire additional 
gain of adoption through licensing, both the winning firm and the 
losing firm will exhaust their expected additional gain from 
innovation to compete for the researcher. Therefore, the 
expected profit of the winning firm is equal to its reservation 
profit in equilibrium, while the equilibrium wage offered by firm 
i and firm j are identical. Firm i and firm j must compete for 
the researcher, even though the expected net profit of the 
winning firm is equal to its expected reservation profit. It is 
because if firm i gives up competition, the expected net profit 
of firm j will increase, while the expected net profit of firm 
i will increase if firm j gives up competition. 
In this chapter, the winning firm can appropriate the entire 
gain from innovation, hence the adoption arrangement is efficient 
and is independent of the winning firm. In contrast, if the 
successful innovator cannot appropriate the licensee's entire 
additional gain of adoption through licensing. Proposition 3.2 
does not necessarily hold. Therefore, this assumption will be 
relaxed in the next chapter, and the Proposition 3.2 will be re-
examined. 
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4 INNOVATION FROM AN INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER 
The wage of a researcher depends on the elasticity of 
supply, and the elasticity of supply is infinite inelastic in 
Chapter 3, so a firm competes with its competitors for a unique 
researcher. Firms offer employment contracts to the researcher, 
while the researcher chooses the contract which gives him the 
greatest utility. Although firms are not required to pay any 
amount to the researcher and they are not identical, firms offer 
identical contracts to the researcher in equilibrium. Besides, 
their expected net profit are equalized in equilibrium. 
In this chapter, the wage is not specified in a contract. 
In contrast, the researcher has not made any agreement with 
firms. In other words, the researcher is an independent party 
and he is the only one who can conduct R&D. Moreover, the 
researcher is not assumed to co-operate with a firm. After an 
innovation has been realized, the researcher either sells the 
ownership of a successful innovation to a firm or patents the 
innovation. If the researcher patents the innovation, he will 
sell licenses to firms so as to maximize his income. On the 
contrary, the researcher sells the ownership to a firm and the 
buyer has the right to sell a license to its competitor. 
Therefore, ‘innovator‘ refers to the researcher and the owner is 
the one who has the ownership of the innovation. In chapter 3, 
the owner of an innovation is assumed to appropriate the entire 
gain from innovation by selling license, so the licensee is 
indifferent between adoption or not. If the owner adopts the 
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innovation alone, the profit of the owner and its competitor are 
called the adoption alone profit for owner and the adoption alone 
profit for licensee. In this chapter, the owner is no longer 
assumed to appropriate the entire gain from innovation, so the 
licensee can get more than the adoption alone profit for 
licensee. 
Since the owner cannot get all the gain from licensing, the 
adoption arrangement is not necessarily the equilibrium and the 
license fee is not equal to the licensee ‘ s gain from adoption. 
Nevertheless, the license fee and the price of the innovation 
depend on the innovation. In this chapter, there is no 
employment relationship between a firm and the researcher. In 
other words, R&D activities require only the researcher. The 
researcher conducts R&D, and sells the innovation or licenses 
after a successful innovation realized. Therefore, this chapter 
will study the payment agreement after a successful innovation 
has been realized. If the researcher sells licenses to firms, 
the payment agreement will specify the licensee fees. On the 
contrary, the researcher sells the innovation to a firm, the 
payment agreement is then the price of innovation. 
What is the price or the licensee fee of the contract? 
After an innovation has been realized' the firm will not pay more 
than its valuation of the innovation. In fact, the valuation of 
the innovation is not less than the price of the innovation, 
^here the valuation is equal to the maximum amount that a firm 
is willing to sacrifice for buying the innovation. Secondly, 
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what is the valuation of the innovation? Since there does not 
exist a competitive market of realized innovation, the price of 
the realized innovation is jointly determined by the buyers and 
seller. Given any realization, the researcher always accepts the 
purchasing contract offered by one firm if its valuation is the 
highest, while the price of the innovation is not less than the 
second highest valuation. It is because firms bid for the 
innovation. 
In previous chapters, the equilibrium adoption arrangement 
is one which maximizes the joint profit of firms i and j, so the 
adoption is efficient. Proposition 3.2 states that the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement is always efficient, but it 
relies on an assumption that the licensee cannot get more than 
the adoption alone profit for licensee. As this assumption is 
relaxed in this chapter , the efficient adoption arrangement is 
not necessarily the equilibrium adoption arrangement. Therefore, 
the equilibrium adoption arrangement and the price of the 
innovation will be studied in this chapter. 
Suppose that the license fee depends on the realization only 
and it is independent of the owner. The researcher will be 
indifferent between selling the ownership or licensing directly. 
It is because a firm will not be better off through buying the 
ownership. When the assumption of the above is relaxed, i.e.' 
the license fee is dependent on the owner of the innovation, the 
researcher is no longer indifferent between selling the ownership 
and patenting the innovation. In this chapter, the license fee 
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is determined by bargaining between the owner and the licensee. 
Similar to the previous chapters, a licensee will buy the license 
from the owner only when the increment of the licensee's profit 
is greater than the decline of the owner ‘ s profit, and the 
license fee must be an amount between the increment of the 
licensee's profit and the decline of the owner‘s profit. 
Firstly, the licensee is required to compensate the decline of 
the owner's profit due to that adoption arrangement. Finally, 
the licensee will pay a portion of the surplus to the owner so 
that the owner will be better off due to licensing. There are 
two possible reasons for the licensee to pay the license fee that 
depends on the owner of the innovation for a given adoption 
arrangement. i) The decline of owner's profit depends on the 
owner, and ii) the sharing of gain depends on the owner. The 
second reason is ignored in this chapter. The first reason is 
obvious, e.g. the decline of the owner's profit is zero if the 
owner is the researcher, while the decline of the owner's profit 
is greater than zero if the owner is a firm. Since the 
researcher will not be worse off and a firm will be worse off 
when another firm adopts the innovation. Thus, the researcher 
will sell its innovation to a firm if the firm can receive more 
license fee than what the researcher can receive through 
licensing. 
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4.1 LICENSING WITH BARGAINING 
Similar to chapter 3, there are three types of adoption 
arrangements, i.e., (SI), (S2) and (S3), and assumption 3.2 and 
assumption 3.3 hold in this chapter. At the beginning, the 
researcher conducts R&D and he has not made any agreement with 
a firm. If the outcome of the innovation is successful, i.e., 
the reduction in marginal cost is positive, the researcher may 
either sell the innovation to a firm or sell licenses to firms 
i and j. In chapter 3, the owner is assumed to appropriate the 
entire gain from adoption by licensing, however it is no longer 
assumed in this chapter. As the owner cannot appropriate the 
entire gain, the owner does not necessarily choose the efficient 
adoption arrangement. In this section, the Proposition 3.2 will 
be re-examined, so it can show whether the equilibrium adoption 
arrangement is dependent on the ownership or not. As this 
section aims to re-examine the Proposition 3.2, the selling of 
the successful innovation will not be discussed here. 
There are three parties in the market, i.e., firm i, firm 
j and the researcher. For each party as the owner, the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement will be analyzed. If the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement is also independent of the 
ownership, the P r o p o s i t i o n 3.2 holds. Consider a circumstance 
that firm j is the owner of the innovation®, the profits for 
8 Aithouah the researcher is the owner at the beginning, 
firm i and firm j may be the owner in equilibrium. It 
because the researcher may sell the innovation to 
^ firm after a successful innovation has been 
realized. 
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firm i and firm j in (SI) are (0, 0) and (0, 9) respectively. 
Suppose that (SI) is the efficient adoption arrangement, i.e., 
Tt' (e, 0) + Tij(e,0) > Tt'(0,e) + Tij(0,e), firm j will sell license to 
firm i, and firm j does not adopt the innovation only when the 
license fee is greater than the decline of firm j ‘ s profit. In 
addition, the firm i ‘ s gain from adoption is 1x^ (6, 0) - tc^  (0,0) -
[Tij(0,e) - Tij(6,0) ], because K'(0,e) - Ti^ (e,0) is to compensate 
firm j. In other words, the license fee will not be less than 
几j(0,e) - Tij(e,0). The firm j also shares percent of the firm 
i's gain from adoption, so the license fee is n^  (0, 9) - ti^  (0, 0) 
+ X [ Tii(e,0) - Tii(0,e) - n;j(0,e) + k^O^O) ]• m this chapter, 
it assumes that the owner shares x percent of the gain from 
adoption when there is one buyer and one seller. In the 
following discussion, license fee in each adoption arrangement 
will be studied. 
Licensing Decision of Firm i 
In this scenario, firm i is the owner of the innovation. 
It chooses among three adoption arrangements (SI), (S2) and (S3) 
which are defined in chapter 3. In each adoption arrangement, 
the license fee will be investigated as follows, 
i) Firm i will not sell the license to firm j in (SI). So the 
9 ^ • < 1 it may be interpreted as cultural 
？ 二 n g 二 。 ⑶ 二 • 二 
t ? ° 1 and the firm j may not sell the license when 
f r i r t h f s bilateral mono'^olistic situation, so 0 < 
1 is a condition for selling the license. 
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total profit of firm i is equal to V''(0) = (0,0) . In this 
adoption arrangement, G''(e) = 0, where is defined as 
the license fee in (SI) and the profit of firm j is Ti^ (e,0). 
ii) In (S2), firm i shares the innovation with firm j, so the 
decline of firm i 's profit is n' (9, 0) — (0, 9) . The gain 
from adoption is then ti^  (G, 9) - 0, 0) - (0, 0) + (8, 6). 
Therefore, the license fee G''(e) and total profit are 
as follows, 
C ( e ) = [TT[i(e,o) - K'(e,e)] + x[Tij(e,e) 一 Ti^ (e,0) 一 
5 
v^'(e) = Tii(e,e) + 
Let di2(e) be the gain from adoption times x' V'^(e) = Ti'(e,0) 
+ di2(e). 
iii) The increment of firm j's profit due to adoption alone is 
lower than the decline of firm i‘s profit in (S3), i.e., 
Tij(0,e) - Tij(6,0) < Ti^e^O) - it implies that (S3) 
is dominated by (SI). 
10 It is the Assumption 3.3. 
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The above results are summarized as follows. 
Owner (Firm i) Firm j 
(51) vu(e) = Tii(e,o) ； 1x^ (9,0) 
(52) vi2(e) = Tii(e,o) + d^^(e) ； irUe'o) + (i-x)/x 
(53) vi3(e) < vii(e) 
While the total profit of firm j can be written as Tc^ {e, 0) 
+ max{0, (ai2(e)}(l-x)/x. Thus, 
v'(e) = raax{ vii(e), } 
=niax{ 0, } + 
As V'O) = max{ 0, } + Ti'(e,0) and V^e) = 11^ (6,0) + 
max{0, d"(e)}(l-x)/x, the adoption arrangement results in max{ 
0, d丄2(e) } and niax{0, d''(9)} (l-x)/x simultaneously. In other 
words, if (S2) is a dominant strategy for firm i to share the 
innovation, it also a dominant strategy for firm j to accept the 
sharing of innovation. 
Licensing Decision of Firm j 
In this scenario, firm j is the owner of the innovation, 
therefore it chooses among the following three adoption 
arrangement so as to maximize its total profit. Since firm 3 is 
the owner, it may adopt the innovation alone and receives 
Ti^(O.e). 
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i) In (SI), firm j sells a license to firm i and firm j does 
not adopt the innovation. Therefore, the decline of firm 
j's profit is Txj(0,e) - (6,0), where the license fee 
cannot less than the decline of firm j‘s profit. In this 
case, the gain from adoption is Tt'(e,0) - it'(0,9) - Ti^(0,e) 
+ 0). Let X times the gain from adoption is d^'(e), the 
total profit of firm j in (SI) is denoted as V^'(e), and the 
license fee is denoted as G^'(e). 
G”（e) = [Ti^(o,0) 一 Tij(e,o)] + x[Ti'(e,0) - Ti'(o,e) 一 
Tij(o,e) + Tt^(e,0)] 
=Tij(0,e) - Tij(e,0) + d^'(e) and 
vji(e) : Tij(o,e) + Gji(e) 
where d^'(e) 二 x[Tii(e,0) - n乂0,e) - n^O'e) + . 
Thus, the total profit of firm j is equal to the sum of the 
firm j ‘ s adoption alone profit and x times the gain from 
adoption. In contrast, profit of firm i is Ti'(0,e) + (1-
x)/x <iji(e). 
ii) In this adoption arrangement, firm j shares the innovation 
with firm i. The decline of firm j's profit is ti^(O,0)-
Tij(e,e), and the gain from adoption is Ti^ (e,e) + Ti'(e,e)-
nj(0,e) - Tii(0,e). Therefore, the license fee is and 
the total profit in (S2) is V^^(e) respectively. 
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Gj2(e) = [Ti^{0,e) - nHe'e)] + x[ Ti^(e,e) + n'(e,e)- Ti^(0,e) 
- Tii(o,e)] 
= Ti^0,0) - Tij(e,0) + d^'O) and 
vj2(e) = 1x^(9,6) + G^'(e) 
==Tt�o,e) + ci^ '(e) 
iii) Similar to the licensing decision of the researcher and 
firm i, firm j will not adopt the innovation alone, since 
the increment of firm i ‘ s profit due to adoption alone is 
greater than the increment of firm j ‘ s profit due to 
adoption alone, i.e., V^'(e) < V^'(e). 
Owner (Firm j) Firm i 
(51) vji(e) = nj(o,e) + dji(e) ； Ti^ (o,e) + (i-x)x a^'ce) 
(52) Vj2(e) 二 Txj(o,e) + dj2(e) ； n^o^e) + (i-x)x d^'(e) 
(53) vj、e) < vji(e) 
Thus, 
V^e) 5 max{ vji(e), Vj2(e) } 
=max{ dji(e), d^'(e) } + n乂0,e) 
while the total profit of firm i is k乂0,e) + niax{ d^He), 
} {l-x)/x. Similar to the previous scenario, the 
adoption arrangement results in max{ d^Me), d � e ) } and 
max{ d^'(e), d^'(e) } (l-x)/x simultaneously. Hence, the 
adoption arrangement is a dominant strategy for firm j to 
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sell license, it is also a dominant strategy for firm j to 
buy the license. An adoption arrangement is regarded as 
efficient if it results in the greatest joint profit. 
Proposition 4.1 is then derived. 
Proposition 4.1 : When a firm is the owner of the innovation, 
the equilibrium adoption arrangement is 
efficient. 
Proof 1, If firm i is the owner and (SI) is the efficient 
adoption arrangement, i.e., Ti'(e,0) + Ti^ (e,0) > 
Tii(e,e) + TT^e'e), it implies that = Tii(e,e) 
+ - Ti'(e.O) - nHe,0) < O. Therefore, 
firm i will choose (SI) as the equilibrium 
adoption arrangement. 
2, If firm j is the owner and (SI) is the efficient 
adoption arrangement, i.e., nUe'O) + ti^  (9,0) > 
Tii(e,e) + Tij(e,6), it implies that > . 
It means that firm j will choose (SI) as the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement. 
QED 
Licensing Decision of the Researcher 
The licensing of a researcher is given in Katz[22], it 
describes the decision of a researcher in selling license. The 
researcher announces how many licenses it will sell and firms bid 
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for the licenses. The Proposition 1 of Katz[22] shows that there 
is no minimum bid if number of licenses is less than number of 
firms. In this section, the researcher has a successful 
innovation and he will sell licenses to firms. If the researcher 
sells only one license, firm i and firm j will bid for the 
license. In another case, the researcher sells licenses to firms 
i and 3, i.e., the adoption arrangement (S2), there is a miniroum 
bid. 
i) In the adoption arrangement (SI), the researcher only sells 
one license, so firm i and firm j bid for the license. The 
firm j gain from adoption is (0,9) - Tij(e,0)' while the 
firm i’s gain from adoption is Ti'(e,0) - Tx'(0,e). By 
Assumption 3.3, Tt'(e,0) - Ti'(0,e) > 1x^0,6) - Tr>(e,0), so the 
winning bid is rtHO'e) - 11�6,0广.Denote G^'(e) as the 
license fee in (SI), 
= TtUo'e) - Ttj(e,o) 
while the profit of firm i is n … , 0 ) - - [ ^ '(0,6) -
ii) The researcher sells licenses to firm i and firm j in (S2). 
If the researcher has sold a license to firm i, profit of 
firm j is 1x^(6,0), so firm j will buy a license providing 
that license fee is less than n乂e,e) - Tij(e,0). Similarly, 
T^  Since profit functions of firm i and firm 3 are common 
knowLSe： the winning bid is n^O^e) - + 6' 
where 6 is positive and 6 0. 
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firm i will buy a license if license fee is less than 
Tii(9,9) - Ti^  (0,0) . It is because the researcher sells two 
license to firms i and j, firm i and firm j do not bid for 
the license, but buying the license is the dominant 
strategy for firm i and firm j. When the researcher sells 
a license to firm i, the firm i ‘ s gain from adoption is 
Ti'(e,e) - Ti'(0,e) so firm i pays x [ Tt'(e,e) - Ti'(0,e) ] for 
license fee. In contrast, the firm j ‘ s gain from adoption 
is Tij(e,e) - Tij(e,0), so the license fee is x [ Ti"e,e) -
0) ；1, Therefore, the researcher receives G""^ (0) in 
(S2), where 
Gd(e) s X [ Tii(e,e) - uUo'e) ] + x [ n^ce^e) - Tr"(e,o)] 
while firm i and firm j receive 
(l-x)[ ni(e,e) - Tii(0,e) ] + n^CO.e) and 
(i-x)[ Kj(e,e) - Tt'(e,0) ] + n^e^o) 
respectively. 
iii) If the researcher sells only one license, firm i will offer 
a winning bid ti^O^e) - it has been discussed in 
(SI). Therefore, it is not an equilibrium adoption 
arrangement• 
Thus, the r e s e a r c h e r receives the license fee G^(e) for a 
given e, where G^(e) = max { G^CG), G ’ e ) }. To summarize the 
above results, the following table depicts license fees of each 
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adoption arrangement as follows. 
Owner (Researcher) 
(51) G^^(e) = 一 TX乂e,o) 
(52) G^'(e) = X [ Ti'(e,e) - Ti^ (o,e) + Ti^ (e,e) - nMe^o)] 
Therefore, it shows that C (6) > G"^  (8) does not imply that 
(SI) is the efficient adoption arrangement, i.e., 0) + 
Tij(e,0) > (e, e) + k^(o, 6). it is because the above bidding 
equilibrium does not guarantee an efficient equilibrium. For 
example, let x=l or the owner is as sinned to appropriate the 
entire gain from adoption, the bidding license fee is only 
Ti^ (0,e) - TiUe'O) which is less than n'(e,0) -
Therefore, if TiHe^O) + Ti'(e,0) > Ti'(e,e) + u^e^e) > Tt"0,e)-
(e, 0), (S2) is chosen as the bidaing equilibrium adoption 
arrangement but it is not efficient. 
Proposition 4.2 : The equilibrium adoption arrangement depends 
on the ownership and it is not necessarily 
efficient. 
Corollary : Since the equilibrium adoption arrangement 
depends on the ownership, the joint profit of 
firm i and firm j will also be affected by 
ownership. 
12 nther bidding mechanisms may give an efficient 
emilibrium, but it is not the goal of this thesis to 
examine each bidding mechanism. 
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4.2 OWNERSHIP RE-ALLQCATTON 
In the pervious section, the income of the researcher is 
equal to G""(0) and he does not sell the ownership to another 
party. In fact, the researcher can sell his innovation to firm 
i or firm j . The ownership re-allocation will be studied in this 
section. After outcome of RScD has been realized, the researcher 
may either sell the innovation or sell licenses. Suppose that 
the researcher sells the innovation, firm i and firm j will bid 
for the innovation, while the winning bid is greater than ^(6). 
Otherwise, it will only sell licenses to firms. 
When firm i and firm j bid for the innovation, the 
reservation profit of firm i is denoted by {9). It is the 
total profit of firm i when firm j is the owner of the 
innovation. The reservation profit of firm j, i.e., is 
defined in the same way. Denote A'iQ) as the maximum amount that 
firm i is willing to pay for the ownership, while A^(e) is the 
maximum amount that firm j is willing to pay for the ownership. 
Ai(e) is given by subtracting the reservation profit of firm i 
from the total profit of firm i when the ownership belongs to 
firm i. Therefore, A^(e) and A^O) denote firm i's valuation of 
the ownership and firm j 丨s valuation of the ownership 
respectively. Since the researcher owns the innovation and 
license fee is the researcher will sell the ownership to 
the firm only when max { A^e), A^e) } > the 
reservation profit of firm i and the reservation profit of firm 
j are stated as follows. 
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Ri(e) = Ti'(0,e) + { (1-X)/X } max { d^^(e), dj2(e) } 
Rj(e) = nj(e,0) + { (1 -x)/x } max { d'^(e), } 
and 
A'O) = V'O) - Ri(e) 
A^e) = vJ(e) - Rj(e) 
subtract A^(e) from A'(e), 
A'(e) - A'(e) = v'(e) 一 v'ce) - o n o ' e ) - ix^(e,e)] 
-(l-x)max{dji(e)-caii(e), dj2(e)-d丄2(e)}/x 
Ri(e) - Rj(e) can be obtained by Proposition 4.1, which is equal 
to max{d^'(e) 一 d^'(6) - Then, it can be shown 
that A'(e) - A^(e) = 0 for all 6. 
Proposition 4.2 : If the equilibrium adoption arrangement is 
efficient, the researcher will sell his 
successful innovation to a firm. 
Proof Since the researcher does not necessarily choose an 
efficient adoption arrangement, therefore the 
researcher may choose (SI) while the efficient 
adoption arrangement is (S2). A'O) and A'(e) have 
been shown to be equalized for all e' and A至（e) is 
equal to Vi(e) - Ri(e) or V^(e) - R^e). If the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement is efficient, i) A " e ) 
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=Aji (e ) implies G"(0) 二 G " ( e ) , and i i ) A^e ) = A^'(e) 
implies G"(e) = C^ 'O) . It means that A^(e) in (SI) 
will be compared with G"'(e), and A^(e) in (S2) will be 
compared with G"'(0) . It can be shown that A^'(e)'' -
C ( e ) > 0 and Aj2(e) - ^ ( 6 ) > 0 
A”（e) - Gri(e) = vji(e)-Tr>(e,o) -（i-x)/x d^ 'O) - G^'(e) 
= n 、 o , e ) - ixj(e,o) + -
=d^'(e) > 0 where cl''(e) = 0 
and 
A^ 'O) - = - (i-x)/x di2(e) - g^ 'o) 
二 (i-x) [Ti乂o,e) - Ti^(e,0)] - (i-x)[ 
Tii(e,e) + n乂e,e) - TTi(e,o)-Tij(e,o)]“ 
> 0 
QED 
Proposition 4.3 : The necessary conditions for the researcher 
to sell license in equilibrium are i) (S2) 
is the efficient adoption arrangement, and 
ii) equilibrium adoption arrangement is 
(SI). 
Proof Consider the condition (S2) is the efficient adoption 
arrangement and the researcher chooses (SI). It 
implies that n^e^e) + n 乂 e ,e) > k^O^O) + iij(e,0), 
13 Aj(e) in (SI) is h'^B) and A^(e) = A^^(e) means that 
(SI) is the efficient adoption arrangement. 
I. Tii(e,e) + Tij(e,e) > u^e^O) + Ti^(e,0) if (s2) is the 
efficient adoption arrangement. 
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i.e., A^e) = Aj2(e), while G"(e) = . 
Aj2(e) - Gri(e) : Vj2(e)-Tij(e,0) - (i-x)/x d^'(e) - G^^(e) 
二 x[Tii(e,e) +Tij(e,e) -Ti'(0,e) -n^o^e)] 
- (i-x) [ Tti(8,e) +Ttj(e,e) -Ti'(e,0)-
Tij(e,o)] 
thus, Aj2(e) - G"' (e) < 0 means that the researcher does 
not sell the innovation. 
QED 
An inefficient adoption arrangement cannot result in the 
possible maximum joint profits of firms i and j. Propositions 
4.1 and 4.2 state that inefficient adoption arrangement may arise 
if the researcher is the owner of the innovation. It means that 
the allocation of ownership does not merely affect the 
distribution of income, but also the total income. Therefore, 
the situation is a counter example of the Coase Theorem. 
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5.3 CONCLUDING REMARK 
In this chapter, the owner of the innovation is not assumed 
to appropriate the licensee's entire gain from adoption, the 
Proposition 3.2 has been re-examined. When RStD is conducted by 
an independent researcher, he may either sell the innovation or 
sell licenses to firms. Following Katz[22], the selling of 
licenses is a bidding equilibrium, where firms bid for licenses. 
Proposition 4.2 shows that the equilibrium adoption arrangement 
will be affected by the ownership. In other words, the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement does not only depend on the 
outcome of innovation, but also the ownership of the innovation. 
Proposition 4.3 depicts a circumstance that the researcher 
does not sell the innovation, it states that the necessary 
condition for the researcher to sell licenses in equilibrium is 
that the equilibrium adoption arrangement is not efficient. On 
the other hand, an efficient equilibrium adoption arrangement 
means that the researcher will sell the innovation in 
equilibrium, since firm i's valuation of the ownership is equal 
to firm j 's valuation of the ownership. Proposition 4.3 
demonstrates that the independent researcher will be better off 
if he sells the ownership to a firm. 
If the equilibrium adoption arrangement is efficient, the 
price of the ownership depends on the realization of innovation. 
For example, (SI) is an equilibrium adoption arrangement, firm 
i pays A^e) in (SI) for the ownership. However, firm i pays 
^ ‘ -M；^ , •—'一 
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Ai(e) in (S2) for the ownership when (S2) is the equilibrium 
adoption arrangement, and firm i will receive the license fee 
from firm j, 
• ^ 
• • -I i. 
• • . ... , •+ , 
！' • -
‘ -
t ^^  I 
• • i 
‘. - -
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5 AN ANALYSIS OF SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 
In the chapter 3, there is only one expert researcher and 
two firms compete for the researcher. Even though one firm 
eventually employs the researcher, the successful innovator can 
sell license to its competitor. Therefore, more than one firm 
can adopt a successful innovation in equilibrium. The 
equilibrium adoption arrangement may be the innovator adoption 
alone or technology sharing. The innovator maximizes its total 
profit by choosing among various feasible adoption arrangements, 
where the total profit is defined as sum of the innovator's 
profit and license fee. In the meantime, profit of the losing 
firm is then defined as the reservation profit in competing for 
the researcher. Although the innovator sells the license to the 
losing firm and the total profit of the losing firm increases, 
the innovator requests a license fee which makes the losing firm 
indifferent between adoption or not. I have assumed that the 
winning firm can get the entire gain from adoption, so the 
adoption arrangement is efficient and the joint profit will be 
maximized in equilibrium. Let us consider the benefit of winning 
the competition, which is the total profit of the winning firm 
above its reservation profit. The benefits for firm i and firm 
3 winning the competition are equal to each other, and hence they 
offer identical employment contracts to the researcher in 
equilibrium. 
in this chapter, the researcher is no longer a unique one 
in the factor market. On the contrary, the supply of researchers 
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is assumed as infinitely elastic, so firms can conduct R&D 
simultaneously or sequentially. When firms conduct R&D in the 
same period, the timing of R&D is called simultaneous R&D, 
otherwise it is stated as sequential R&D in this thesis. The 
relationship between R&D expenditure and timing for conducting 
RScD is investigated in this chapter, where R&D expenditure is the 
labour cost for a firm. Suppose that firms are identical and 
wage is constant over time, the R&D expenditure is merely 
determined by the timing of R&D. For example, if a firm conducts 
R&D later than its competitor, which has realized a successful 
innovation, the firm will invest less in R&D than its competitor. 
It is because the marginal benefit for conducting R&D has been 
reduced after realizing a successful innovation. Moreover' the 
first innovator will benefit from adopting the successful 
innovation alone, it will invest more than the second firm. The 
example shows the fact that R&D expenditure, reflects the 
strategic behaviour for conducting R&D. As Fudenberg[9 3 and 
Reinganum[33] indicate that a decrqiasing cost of adoption is a 
necessary condition for sequential technology adoption, this 
chapter provides an example that decreasing marginal cost of 
conducting R&D is not a necessary condition for sequential R&D. 
Suppose that firm i and firm j are using same production 
technology and they conduct R&D simultaneously. Fortunately, 
both their innovations are successful, a firm will consider to 
buy a license from its competitor only when, i) its innovation 
is not better than its competitor's innovation, i.e., its 
marginal cost reduction is not greater than its competitor's 
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marginal cost reduction, and ii) the joint profit of firms i and 
3 after licensing is a maximum. 
In another case, firms i and j conduct R&D sequentially and 
they commit to a timing for conducting R&D. Let firm i be the 
firm conducting R&D earlier and the innovation of firm i is 
successful, firm j then either buys a license from firm i or 
conducts R&D in the next period. When firm j does not buy the 
license, the profit of firm j in the first period and the second 
period, are equal to (e, 0) and an expected gain from conducting 
R&D respectively. On the contrary, if firm j buys a license from 
the innovator, the expected total profit of firm j in the 
mentioned alternative choice will be the reservation profit of 
firm j in licensing. 
According to the above discussion, the R&D expenditure 
depends on the timing of R&D, i.e., whether the firm conducts R&D 
earlier or later than its competitor. However, the timing of 
conducting R&D becomes another question. Suppose that a firm 
benefits from conducting R&D in the first period and the 
equilibrium is Nash, firm i and firm j always conduct R&D 
simultaneously in the first period. Why does a firm benefit from 
conducting R&D in the first period? Let 'e' be the amount 
invested by a firm in the second period, the firm can gain more 
if is invested in the first period. It is because the total 
profit of the successful innovator increases for all Periods. 
Therefore, each firm will choose to conduct R&D as soon as 
possible, even though there is no discount factor. However, a 
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sequential R&D is possible only if the expected profit of firm 
i and firm j are equal to each other in equilibrium^ It has been 
pointed out in Fudenberg[9], which is a study of technology 
adoption with consideration for tlxe strategy of preemption. As 
firms are assumed to be identical and they can choose the timing 
of R&D, there is no reason to support an argument that their 
expected profits are not equalized in equilibrium. Therefore, 
the R&D expenditure for firms can be derived from the 
equilibrium. 
The remaining question of this chapter is whether the 
sequential R&D can dominate the simultaneous R&D. In other 
words, what is the equilibrium timing of R&D? Is it sequential 
or simultaneous R&D? Assuming that firms are identical and 
expected profits of them are equalized in equilibrium, these 
assumptions are held regardless of the timing of R&D, so 
assumptions 3.3 does not hold in this chapter. As the follower 
can also benefit from sharing the technology, the equilibrium 
timing of R&D is then dependent on the amount of adoption alone 
profit. AS long as the adoption alone profit is sufficient 
large, the benefit for conducting R&D sequentially will be much 
greater than the benefit for simultaneous R&D. 
The outcome of R&D is simplified as two-state, which is 
different fro. chapter 3 and chapter 4. In the previous 
Chapters, the outcome of 腳 is defined over an interval, whereas 
it Will only be defined as two points in this chapter. Although 
the situation is simplified, the assumption of previous chapter 
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will only make the adoption arrangements complicated when it is 
applied in this chapter. Thus, results of this chapter can be 
held as the simplified assumption is relaxed. Sequential R&D is 
studied by using a two-period model, so multi-period model will 
not be investigated in this chapter. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, 
the sequential R&D is assumed as the equilibrium timing of R&D, 
while the second part concerns about the simultaneous R&D, the 
two feasible timing will be compared at the end of this chapter. 
An equilibrium timing of R&D will be derived and also the 
associated R&D expenditure. Thus, it can show the relationship 
of the timing of R&D and the R&D expenditure for each firm. 
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5.1 CHOICES OF LICENSING AND CONDUCTING R&D 
In this chapter, there are two identical firms in the 
market, they will invest for two periods which are called the 
first period and the second period in this chapter. Therefore, 
they may conduct R&D simultaneously or sequentially. In this 
section, sequential R&D is assumed as the equilibrium and firm 
i is assumed to conduct R&D in the first period, the second 
period R&D expenditure will be discussed in this section. 
Suppose that the successful innovation has been realized, 
firm 3 either conducts R&D in the second period or buys a license 
from firm i. As the assumption of outcome is changed in this 
chapter, i.e., the innovation is either successful or failure, 
and the probability of failure is decreasing in the R&D 
expenditure. Let v(.) be the probability of failure with v，（.） 
< 0 and profit of firm i is a function of the marginal cost 
reduction of firm i and firm j. 9. denotes the marginal cost 
reduction when the innovation is failure, whereas denotes the 
marginal cost reduction when the innovation is successful. 
Although e. is equal to zero and will never be adopted, it is 
preserved as an opposite notation of . 
When firm i has realized a successful innovation, it will 
patent the innovation and the patent prohibits other firms from 
duplication. Therefore, firm j cannot duplicate the innovation 
of firm i in the second period. However, firm 3 can conduct R&D 
using the same research method and obtains an outcome in the 
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second period. The point is clarified here that an identical 
marginal cost reduction does not imply using the same technology, 
and the same research method for R&D can result in two or more 
technologies with same marginal cost reduction. Therefore, firm 
3 can conduct R&D after firm i has realized a successful 
innovation. On the other hand, firm j may buy a license from 
firm i, while the license fee is equal to the expected gain of 
firm j from conducting R&D. 
As firm i and firm j are identical, the payoff of firm i is 
defined as n' (6', ) where 9' and = Sh. The four possible 
payoffs of firm i are as follows, 
n'ceweo = Tio, Tii(eL,eH) = nz, 
TX' ( Gh , OH ) = Til, = Tt3. 
Since firm i and firm j are identical, the following are derived 
from above definitions. 
Tt^cewe.) = Tii(e“eH) = 
u'iQn.Qn) = JlHBn.en), Tl^  ( ©h , 0. ) = TI^  ( , 6« ). 
Similar to assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, several inequalities are 
assumed, where they are given below, 
Ti^ (e.,eH) < - < n� 
< n^cen^en) ^ n � < lu 
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T^'Oh,e.) - > H'OH^GH) - n^e.^en) 
The last inequality means that the benefit for innovation 
adoption is decreasing in the innovation of firm j, it will be 
stated in Assumption 5.2. Therefore, the benefit from innovation 
adoption depends on the R&D outcome of its competitor. 
Assumption 5.1 : TI2 < < iXi < TI3 
Assumption 5.2 : TI3 - n� > iii - TI2 
Assumption 5.3 : V(.) <0, v"(.) > 0. 
In the following discussion, firm i and firm j are regarded 
as leader and follower respectively, where firm i is assumed to 
conduct R&D in the first period. 
Decision of the Follower 
After the outcome of the leader has realized, the decision 
of the follower depends on the outcome of the leader in the 
second period. Suppose that the leader has failed, both firms 
receive Tio in the first period. Moreover, they will conduct R&D 
simultaneously in the second period. Although it is the second 
time for firm i to conduct R&D, the R&D likelihood function, 
i.e., represented by v(.), is the same as likelihood function of 
the follower. In another case, the innovation of the leader is 
successful. AS there are only two states of nature, the leader 
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cannot further reduce its marginal cost by conducting R&D. Thus, 
there is no simultaneous R&D in the second period. 
i) When 9' = 6“ i.e., the leader fails in the first period, 
both firms conduct R&D in the second period. After their 
outcome of R&D has been realized, an equilibrium adoption 
arrangement will be chosen. The successful innovator 
decides whether to sell the license or not. Let M s max { 
TI3 + TI2/ Til + Til }, that is the largest joint profit. Define 
H'^  ( Gl ) as the maximum expected total profit of firm j in the 
second period, while H^ ' (61,) denotes the maximum expected 
total profit of firm i in the second period. The ,L， 
denotes that no successful innovation has been realized in 
the first period. In equilibrium = H'CeO as they are 
identical, where H^ e.) and tf (9,) denote the two period 
expected net profits of firm i and firm j respectively. 
When one of them fails in R&D, the failed one receives TI2 
and hence the successful innovator gets M - K2. In 
contrast, firm i and firm j receive M/2 so long as both of 
them succeed. In addition, they receive tio if both firms 
fails in the second period. 
2 �•• 
The e q u i l i b r i u m must satisfy the following first order 
condition. 
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-V(e;j[(M-Ti,-TiJv(e:J = 1 (5-1) 
^ « 
while the failed leader will also conduct R&D in the second 
period. 
H'Mej 三 max Ti,v(e,J v(e,J + (M-tx,) v(e, J [l-v(e, j]+Ti,v(e, J [l-v(e, J eiL 
Since H^^CeO and H^'CeO in equilibrium, equate the two 
terms. It implies that v(eiL*) 二 v(ejL*)i5 and eii/ = ^ 二 
where ,L' states that the leader failed in the first 
period. 
ii) When = ea, which means that the leader has succeeded in 
the first period. In this case, the follower chooses 
between conducting R&D in the second period and buying 
licensing from the leader. Since the leader has succeeded 
and outcome of R&D is defined over 2 points, the leader 
cannot improve its production technology by conducting RfidD. 
First consider the situation that the follower conducts R&D 
in the second period. Firm j receives if it fails, while 
firm i and firm j shares the equilibrium joint profit M if 
firm i succeeds. 
： ； a n d v ( e i � = is a 
solution. 
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H2j(ej = max Ti,v(e,J ejH ^ 
It will satisfy the first order condition as follows, 
- (5-2) 
• • 
Compare equations (5.1) with (5.2), the relationship of e^ . 
and ejH depends on those terms in square brackets of (5.1) 
and (5.2) . It implies the following expressions, 
(M-Tio-Ti2)v(e;) + (M/2 - n2)[l-v(e;)] - (M/2 - 1x2) > 0 e , > e,/ 
(M-ito-Ti.)v(e,.*) + (M/2 一 Ti.)[l-v(e,.-)] 一（M/2 - Tta) 二 0 - e】：=e乂 
(M-Tio-K.)v(e,.-) + (M/2 - Tt2)[l-v(ej�] - (M/2 - < 0 - e,.' < 
L.H.S. can be re-written as below expressions, 
(M/2 - TXo) ^  0 - ejr； ^ ejH* 
(M/2 - Tio) < 0 终 BjL* < ejH* 
Since M . max { K3 + TI2, tc. . k. } and M/2 ^ n. > n。，n,.' > 
Hj二 Compare H^Ue.) with tf^Cen). the following discussion 
will show that H2j(eL) is strictly greater than H^^en). It 
is because e,.' > e,/ in equilibrium, so the expected net 
profit of firm j in e^  = e. is strictly greater than its 
expected net profit in = e.. When the follower chooses 
ejL 二 e^, the expected net profit of the follower in 二 Gl 
i: alsl strictly greater than the expected net profit in 
二 e,. However, it has been shown that e,.* > ej/, thus. 
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H^UQl) > net expected profit as firm j chooses e^ L = e，/ 
> h^'Oh) 
A formal analysis is as follows, where tiq > 1x2 and M-itj > Hx 
H'He.) - H'^en) = {Tiov(ei.-) +Tt2 [ ) ] ) - Tl2V(e,H') 
+ {(M - Ti2)v(eiL*)+ M/2[l-v(eiL*)]}[l-v(ejL*)] 
一 M/:2[l-v(ejH*)] 一 e j L * + ejH* 
> V (ejH*) {Ttov(ejH*) +TI2 [ 1 一V(ejH*) ] 一TCz} 
+ {M - TI2 - M/2[l-v(ejH”]}v(ejH*) 
when GjL = eiL = 
> 0 
The above results are summarized in proposition 5.1. 
proposition 5.1 : = H^^e.) > H^HOh) and e,.* = e,: > e ^ . 
The proposition 5.1 has been shown as before and it tells 
the result that firm j will invest less in R&D if firm i has 
succeeded in R&D. Besides, the net expected profit of the 
follower has been demonstrated be decreasing in the first period 
innovation of the leader. 
Licensing by the Successful Innovator 
in the previous section, it studies the decision of the 
follower in two states of nature. For = G" the analysis of 
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the second period has been completed, whereas it is not a 
completed analysis for 6' = . Why has the analysis not been 
completed? Assuming that payoffs of the leader and the follower 
will realize only when the outcome of R&D has realized and firm 
i and firm j agree an adoption arrangement. Therefore, the 
leader can sell a license to the follower in the first period. 
When the successful leader sells the license to the follower, the 
leader will request a license fee which makes the follower 
indifferent between buying the license or not. Profit of the 
follower will thus increase by H'^ (0h) - Ha in the second period. 
The reservation of the follower is tij for buying the first period 
license, while it is equal to TI2 + H'^ CGh) for buying a two-period 
license. The first period license and two-period license are a 
permit of adopting the innovation in the first period and a 
permit of adoption for two periods respectively. Since the 
follower cannot be better off by buying a first period license, 
the possibility of buying a first period license is ruled out. 
The follower considers only buying a two-period license or 
conducting R&D in the second period. Since the follower is 
indifferent between buying the license or not, the gain of the 
leader from selling the license will be investigated. If a 
successful innovation has realized in the first period and the 
equilibrium adoption arrangement is chosen, the joint profit of 
firm i and firm j for two periods is equal to 2M. As the 
expenditure of firm i in conducting R&D is a sunk cost, the 
expenditure will not be discussed. In other words, the leader 
can get e,H and the gain from the first period adoption if the 
follower buys the license. Therefore, the choice of buying a 
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two-period license can maximize the joint expected net profit of 
firm i and firm j. Define R'^COh) and R'^ CGl) as the two-period 
reservation profits of the follower and the leader in licensing, 
while the leader has succeeded in R£tD. 
R'^CGH) = Ti2 + tfj(eH) 
R^OH) = TX3 + (M - Ti.)v(e,H*) + M/2 [1 一 v(ejH*)] 
The necessary condition of licensing is 2M - R^H^h) - R^ '(Qh)之 0. 
In other words, the sum of their reservations must be less than 
the two periods maximum joint profit. If R^ '^ Cea) and R^ (^Qu) 
cannot fulfil the necessary condition, the first period adoption 
arrangement must be the leader adoption alone. 
Proposition 5.2 : The successful innovator sells the license 
to its competitor in the first period, where 
the license fee is equal to 2M - -
Rii(eH). 
Proof Define the first period reservations of firms i and j 
as above. It can be shown that R^ 'Cen) and 只丄丄⑷ can 
fulfil the necessary condition, i.e., 2M - R”（6h)-
Rii(eH) > 0. 
64 
2M - Rij(eH) - RU(eH) 
= 2 M - Mv(ejH.) - (1X3+1X2) - M[1 - v(ejH*)] + e】/ 
=M[l-v(e]H*)] + (M--TX3-T12) 一 M[1 一 v(e,H*)] + 
= ( M - M ) [ 1 一 v(ej/)] + (M一TI3一TI2) + e,H* 
= ( M - TC3 - 1x2) + e^ H* 
> 0 since M > 113 + TI2 
where M - TI3 - 1x2 is gain of the leader from adoption 
arrangement, and e�/ is the second period expenditure 
of the follower in R&D. Therefore, licensing in the 
first period is an equilibrium, i.e., the leader sells 
a two-period license to the follower. Since the 
follower cannot get more than its reservation, the 
leader receives license fee that is equal to 2M 一 
R"(Qh) - R'^CGh) , which is the licensing benefit. 
Moreover, the license fee is virtually equal to e^ H* if 
M = TI3 + TI2. 
QED 
When adoption alone is the equilibrium adoption arrangement, 
the license fee is equal to e^. In other words, the follower 
does not conduct R&D and gives the R&D expenditure to the leader 
for buying a two period license. The proposition 5.2 has shown 
that licensing after successful innovation realization is always 
feasible, when the production technology cannot be further 
improved by the leader. It eliminates the circumstances that the 
follower cannot pay for the license fee and the follower can gain 
more from conducting R&D in the second period. 
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5.2 EQUILIBRIUM OF SEQUENTIAL R&D 
In this chapter, one crucial assumption has been made, which 
is the equalization of expected net profit at the beginning of 
the first period. The question of whether simultaneous R&D in 
the first period dominates sequential R&D or not will not be 
studied in this section, it will investigated at the end of this 
chapter. Define H'^  (eO® and H'' (GO® as the two period expected 
net profits of firm i and firm j respectively. In this section, 
firm i is assumed as the leader, so H'^Cej® and H^'Cej" are given 
as follows, 
H”（eLr = v(e广）[Tio+H^Hej] + [1 - v(er)] R^'Oh) 
HU(eL广=v(e广）[Tio+H^^(e.)] + [1 - v(e广）][2M-R^^(eH)] 一 e广 
where ei® is the R&D expenditure made by the leader in the first 
period. The expression of consists of two parts. The 
first part, i.e., tio + is the expected profit of firm j 
if firm i fails in the first period. The term R'Hen) has been 
mentioned as the expected net profit of firm j so long as firm 
i succeeds in conducting R&D. In contrast, 2M - Ri^ej is the 
expected net profit of firm i for a successful innovation. Since 
ei must satisfy the following first order condition, 
_ v，（e广）[2M - jeHOn) - T^o - H^^ce.) ] = 1 (5.3) 
If firm i does not conduct R&D in the first period, its expected 
profit is no + which is not greater than As 
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H'^ Ox,)" = Ti�+ H'^ ce.) > Ti. + H2j(eH) = Rij(eH) > 
it has been shown that the expected net profit of firm i is 
strictly greater than the expected net profit of firm j because 
the leader conducts R&D without competition in the first period. 
However, it has not explained why firm j is the follower, because 
a firm chooses freely to conduct R&D in any period. Therefore, 
firm i will be the leader if and only if H^'Cej = , hence 
the following expression is implied. 
2[1 -v(e广） ] [M 一 ] = e广 (5.4) 
M - Ti2 - > 0 (5.4') 
where (5.4) is the necessary condition of sequential R&D. Since 
(5.4') always holds, it implies that there exists a e , so that 
= h'^ CGl) if sequential R&D is an equilibrium. Compare the 
square bracket of (5.3) with the square bracket of (5.2), it 
implies that e^ > e�/• 
2M 一 Rij(eH) - Tio - - M/2 + Tio 
= 2 M - [Tt. + H^HGh)] 一 H^'ce.) - M/2 
= [ M - 1X2 - H^Ue.) ] + [ M - M/2 - H2j(eH) 3 
> 0 by definitions of and H^ 'COh)' 
ei® > ejH* 
一 ^ The m a x i : payoff of firm j in e: = e、， e : = Bh are 
/M 一 1X2) and M/2 respectively. Since (M - n.) is the 
hiahest payoff after = e., it must be greater t h ^ 
S'.^eO. Similarly, M/2 ^ so M/2 must be strictly 
greater than H^ 'Cea). 
— —••丨• •••"••••iiwimTinrnmiftf 
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Proposition 5,3 ： When a successful innovation is realized and 
the realized technology cannot be improved 
any more, the R&D expenditure of its 
competitor will never be greater than the 
R&D expenditure of the innovator in 
sequential R&D. However, the relationship 
holds only when the roles of follower and 
leader are determined exogenously. 
Proof According to proposition 5.2, the leader will sell a 
license to the follower if a successful innovation has 
realized. In this case, the second period R&D 
expenditure is equal to zero, because the technology 
cannot be improved. On the contrary, the follower 
does not buy the license, its R&D expenditure will be 
less than the R&D expenditure of the successful 
leader, since ei® > e^ H* 
QED 
— - •••••_•丨_»_,•丨丨•丨•睡圓•州… 
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5.3 SIMULTANEOUS R&D OR SEQUENTIAL R&D 
In sections 5.1 and 5.2, sequential R&D has been analyzed, 
where firm i is assumed as the leader. However, sequential R&D 
may not be the equilibrium. Therefore, simultaneous R&D is 
studied in this section. Two kind of simultaneous R&D are 
investigated, they are the cases of central planner and 
competitive market. In both cases, firm conducts R&D 
simultaneously. If one firm succeeds, it will share the 
innovation to another firm in the case of central planner. It 
is the difference between cases of central planner and 
competitive market. 
In this section, necessary conditions of sequential R&D are 
further investigated, while these conditions are based on whether 
the equilibrium of sequential R&D can dominate the equilibrium 
of simultaneous R&D or not. Moreover, the two period expected 
net profit of firm i and firm j are equal to each other in 
sequential equilibrium, so it implies the equation (5.4'). 
Define and as the expected net profit of firm i 
and firm j in simultaneous R&D. The necessary and sufficient 
condition for sequential R&D is H^^e.)^ ^ and H^^e.r ^ 
Hij(etr. Before this necessary and sufficient condition is 
derived, the first best solution of the R&D competition has to 
be investigated in the case of central planner. So long as the 
R&D expenditure in simultaneous R&D is the first best solution' 
sequential R&D will not be the equilibrium. 
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Suppose that the case of central planner is the equilibrium, 
firms i and j maximize their joint expected net profit in the 
second period. The second period first best solution is derived 
as the following, 
max +Mv(e,/)[l [l 
ejL . eiL^  
where eji/ and eii/ are the first best solution in the second 
period if e" = e�二 e^  in the first period. In the case of 
central planner, joint profit is M except both firms fail in 
conducting R&D. First order conditions are depicted as below 
expressions, where the following expressions are based on 它义广= 
Gji, / 
- [ M - 2txo ] V丨（ei^) v(e广）-1 = 0 
- [ M - 2tio ] v ， （ e 广 ） - 1 二 0 
As V，（ •）< 0, M - 2tco > 0 and w > 0, they imply v( . ) > 0 hence 
eii/* = ej广 > 0. So long as v( •) is decreasing convex in，e’，the 
first order conditions give the first best solution. In the 
first period, firm i and firm j co-operate and choose e广 and e/* 
to maximize their joint expected net profit, i.e., the following 
expression, 
-rimimMBiWllwiiliBHill I dJaiH lil'li I i. 
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max 2M[ v(e/)[l - V ( e / ) ] ) [L -v(e/)l+fl -v(e/)l[l -v(e/)l 
o • ^ e> t ^ * • - • -
where e/* and e/' satisfy the following first order conditions. 
- 2 V' [ M - n�一 ] = w ——(5.5a) 
- 2 vi(e/*)v(ei“）[ M - tio - tf^OJ ] = w (5.5b) 
Since e/* = e/* > 0, which means that firm i and firm j conduct 
R&D in the first period. However, it does not imply the 
competitive simultaneous R&D is the equilibrium. Since (5.5a) 
and (5.5b) only tell us that the first best solution is e f = e/* 
> 0 , it does not state that e^ '* = 瓜 w h e r e is the R&D 
expenditure made by firm i in the competitive simultaneous R&D. 
Consider the competitive simultaneous R&D as below, 
max fTt�+H2i(ej]v(e广)v(e,)+[R"(ej]v(e,)[l-v«)] + [2M-R”(ej][l-v(e,)]v(e/ 
+M[1 _v(e广)][1-v(e广)]-e广 
. 几 J 
First order condition is given as below, 
_v，（er*) { M[1 - v(e 广）]+ v(e 广）[2M _ R^USh)] 二 1 
- v(e广）[Tio + H2j(ej] - [1 - v(e广）]只"（00 } 
or 
-v,(e广）{ M _ Rij(eH) + v(er)C2M-M-iXo-H^^(e.)3 } = 1 …(5-6) 
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Proposition 5.4 ： The sufficient condition for competitive 
simultaneous R&D as the equilibrium, i.e., 
e 广 = e 广 = e 广 = e / * , is [ H^^e.) + n � - M ] 
v(e 广）=R"(eH) - M. 
Proof When simultaneous R&D is the first best solution, the 
sequential R&D cannot dominate the simultaneous R&D. 
In other words, e广* = e广* = e/* = e/*, equate (5.5a) 
and (5.6), 
[H2j(ej + Tio - M ] v(e广）二 Rij(eH) - M • • (E) 
As the RHS is always negative, so 
+ Tio - M < 0 (E') 
Therefore, the necessary condition for sequential R&D 
is that (E) does not fulfil. When LHS of (E) > RHS of 
(E), it implies e 广 = e 广 > e/* 二 e/*. On the 
contrary, LHS of (E) < RHS of (E) implies e ^ = e : < 
e 广 = e 广 
QED 
Corollary : The sequential R&D is an equilibrium, when (5.4) 
is fulfilled and + n� 一 M > 0, where the 
second condition implies that ^ M - Ko-
The possibility of sequential R&D has discussed in this 
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section. However, it has not determined the equilibrium timing 
of R&D, i.e., sequential R&D or simultaneous R&D. Since a firm 
can be better off if its competitor is the follower, they will 
conduct R&D in the first period simultaneous. Sequential R&D is 
the equilibrium if and only if H^ 'Ce,)" > and ^ 
H^ ^ (Gl So long as those necessary conditions for sequential 
R&D cannot be satisfied, the feasibility of sequential R&D is 
ruled out. 
Proposition 5.5 : When sequential R&D is the equilibrium, n , 
> e广 = e / * and e广 in H^'O.)" = H^'Ol)" is 
strictly less than e^ in (5.3). 
Proof Since (5.4) is an sequential R&D condition, substitute 
(5.4) into H'^ CGl)®, the first order condition for e广* 
becomes 
- V ' (Gi^ *) [ 2M 一 2tio - ] = 1 (5.7) 
Compare the square brackets of (5.7) with (5.3), 
2[M - Tio - tf^e.) ] - 2M + R^^Oh) + Ho + H^'O.) 
二 -11�+ Ti. - H^'O.) + n'HQn) 
< 0 
e广 in (4.3) > e广 in (5.7) 
Moreover, compare the square brackets of (5.7) with 
(5.5a) and (5.5b). As v(.) < 1 hence e ^ > e 广=e/*. 
QED 
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The above proposition tells the fact that the leader will 
invest more in sequential R&D than the first best solution. 
However, the firm i does not necessarily invest in the first 
period so that it becomes the leader, because e广* > ei^ * < e^* by 
Propositions 5.4 and 5.5. 
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5.4 CONCLUDING REMARK 
When firms are identical and timing of R&D are chosen by 
those firms, simultaneous actions are always assumed. It means 
that firms will take identical actions, so they conduct R&D in 
the same period and plan identical amount of R&D expenditure. 
However, this chapter shows that sequential R&D is feasible, 
although timing of R&D are determined by firms. It is because 
simultaneous R&D is not necessarily a pareto optimal equilibrium. 
Therefore^ the sequential R&D equilibrium exists if condition 
(5.4) and (E' ) are fulfilled, while the equilibrium of sequential 
R&D does not rely on an assumption of decreasing cost for 
conducting R&D. It is different from historical studies in R&D 
and technology adoption. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The employment contract offered by a firm is affected by the 
supply of researcher. It specifies a wage paid to the 
researcher. When the supply of researchers is not infinitely 
elastic, the wage will be influenced by the competition between 
firms. In chapter 3, there is only one researcher in the market, 
the competition in R&D becomes a competition for the researcher 
by using employment contracts. Even though firms are not 
identical, they will offer identical employment contracts to the 
researcher in equilibrium. So long as the supply of researchers 
is not infinitely inelastic and firms are identical in chapter 
5, firms can choose the timing of conducting R&D and will conduct 
rScD as soon as possible, it can also result in the sequential R&D 
in equilibrium providing that their expected net profits are 
equalized in equilibrium. The necessary conditions for 
sequential R&D are characterized in chapter 5. In chapter 4, an 
independent researcher has been analyzed. Firms do not conduct 
RScD, but they can buy the license from the owner or the ownership 
from the researcher. Thus, the R&D expenditure of firms vary 
with the realization of the innovation, chapter 4 shows that the 
equilibrium innovation adoption is not necessarily efficient. 
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